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论工人加入工会的选择权——法律与经济学分析视角

1 Beijing Jiaotong University

Abstract

从微观经济学的角度来看,若将工会视为提供劳动权益保护的服务市场供给方,那么劳动者便是该服务市场的消费者,作为消费者,其拥有相应的知情权、选择权等。从理性经济人的视角出发,在拥有选择权的情况下,劳动者会决定是否加入工会,并选择对自己最有利的工会。基于劳动者是消费者以及存在劳动者维权市场这一前提,本文将运用法律经济学的分析工具,如消费者选择理论和成本效益分析,来探究劳动者是否愿意加入工会、应采取何种措施鼓励劳动者积极加入工会,并对非工会会员的 “搭便车” 行为进行分析,以期提高工会保护劳动者劳动权益的积极性和效率。

Keywords

How to Cite

Li, K. (2026). 论工人加入工会的选择权——法律与经济学分析视角. 亚洲社会创新与发展期刊, 1(1), 23–40. 取读于 从 https://ajsid.org/index.php/pub/article/view/9

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